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Abstract  
 
The aim of this paper is to excavate and analyse Henri Bergson’s “problematic” 
thinking. This task will be prosecuted through a close reading of his two-part 
introduction to The Creative Mind – the text in which Bergson most concisely and 
conclusively articulates the “problematic” character of his work. As I will attempt to 
show in this paper, Bergson’s work is “problematic” in two respects, one to do with 
methodology and the other metaphysics. These two, furthermore, are intimately 
entwined: on the one hand, Bergson’s method of problematisation emerges from the 
findings of his metaphysical inquiries, while on the other, it is through the application 
of his problematising method that the findings of his metaphysical inquiries can be 
deemed as reliably accurate. In exploring this “problematic” intersection of Bergson’s 
methodology and metaphysics, I will first discuss what Bergson takes to be one of the 
biggest problems for philosophy: the lack of adequate “precision.” As we will see, many 
of the major themes and concepts of Bergson’s work, such as duration and intuition, 
both spring from and converge on his efforts to address this problem. The pursuit of 
precision also calls for a “problematic approach” that is appropriate for the 
metaphysical reality it seeks to handle – an approach I will outline in the second part of 
this paper. This will be followed by a discussion of how Bergson’s problematic 
method/metaphysics involves a critique of what he refers to as “fictitious,” “phantom” 
or “pseudo-problems.” This “negative” aspect of Bergsonian problematisation will then 
be reconsidered in the final part of the paper alongside its “positive” dimension – posing 
problems in terms of time. 
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Introduction 
 
The notion of the “problem” is an important feature of twentieth-century French 
philosophy. This is especially the case for those figures associated with the 
epistemological tradition in twentieth-century French thought, including Cavaillès, 
Bachelard, Canguilhem, Althusser and Foucault. Indeed, in the opinion of Thomas 
Osborne, the “greatest lesson” of this tradition is “the fact that humans are 
problematizing beings” (2). It is with Henry Bergson, however, that this century of 
French fascination with the “problem” commences; and it is with Gilles Deleuze, the 
most Bergsonian of scholars amongst his contemporaries, that it arguably reaches its 
apogee. 1  In some respects, affiliating Bergson with the subsequent lineage of 
“problematic” French thinkers is incongruous, for many of these latter philosophers 
were quite explicit in their criticism of Bergson and/or were at pains to distance their 
work from Bergsonism. But as Élie During has argued convincingly, detaching their 
problematic programmes from Bergson’s work is easier said than done. In fact, During 
suggests that Bergson’s problematic philosophy provides the grounds for the “non-
positivist conception of problems” developed by proponents of the “French 
epistemological tradition” (4).2  During arrives at this position by focusing on the 
problem-based manner in which Bergson explores the history of philosophy and the 
history of science, with special emphasis on Bergson’s pedagogical practice. By way 
of contrast, the aim of this paper will not be to compare Bergson’s problematic 
philosophy with that of his various successors. Instead, the more modest objective here 
is simply to explicate and analyse the “what is” of Bergson’s problematic philosophy – 
a task to which During’s paper does not give full attention, nor Osborne’s, due to their 
comparative agendas. And in pursuing this objective, the present paper will be guided 
not by the “history of problems” that Bergson explores but rather his introduction to 
The Creative Mind, which provides us with the most concise and conclusive account of 
how Bergson himself saw his problematic philosophy.3 
 
In During’s insightful paper he mentions a number of key “problems” that animate 
Bergson’s work at various stages of his career, such as the problem of [end of p. 31] 
causality, the problem of change, and the problem of creation. To this one could add 
the basic point that each of Bergson’s major books revolves around or is driven by the 
effort to articulate a particular problem. Because of this, Bergson’s philosophy is not 
“systematic” à la Kant or Hegel (Bergson, Creative Evolution xiv). One will certainly 
find many of the same themes and concepts throughout his texts, but even in these 
instances the attentive reader will discover that there are often discrepancies and 
inconsistencies across his books (for example with his notions of the virtual/actual) due 
in large part to the differing demands of the distinct problematics to which the concepts 
are directed. It is due to this “problematic” way of working that the introduction to The 
Creative Mind takes on such immense importance, for it is in this two-part introduction, 
written at the end of his career, that Bergson provides us with a sort of intellectual 
biography that sums up what he has been doing all these years. As he remarks in the 
short preface to the book, the essays “bear mainly upon the method I believe should be 
recommended to the philosopher” (Creative Mind iii). In this two-part introduction, 
which takes up a third of the whole book, Bergson distinguishes between his various 
projects and problems, but in doing so he also reflects on the threads between them. As 
a result, these two essays at once separate out and bring together Bergson’s major books 
and philosophical achievements. This retrospective summation is pursued 
simultaneously in two registers, or along two threads, one methodological and the other 
metaphysical, which together comprise Bergson’s problematic philosophy. Bergson’s 
philosophy is thus “problematic” in both nature and method, and these two facets are 
inextricably linked. This paper will show how, first by discussing Bergson’s demand 
for “precision” in philosophy and the equivalence he draws between properly stating 
and solving problems, before going on to explore what Bergson refers to as “fictitious,” 
“phantom” or “pseudo-problems” – false problems, in his view, that have plagued the 
history of philosophy. In the final major section of this paper I will return to the 
interrelation of Bergson’s “problematic” metaphysics and methodology, providing 
further detail and illustrations of its negative and positive aspects. 
 
 
Precision in Philosophy 
 
The two introductions to The Creative Mind form somewhat of an odd couple. To begin 
with, they are two parts of a whole, rather than two independent introductions. The 
second part is also three times longer than the first. The most likely reason for this is 
because they are formulated problematically, by which I mean that for each one 
Bergson poses himself a problem which he then addresses. To be more precise, in the 
 first part he poses and then pursues a particular problem to its natural end, which takes 
him to a second problem that he then addresses in the second part to its natural end. 
 
One need look no further than the first sentence of Part I to find its guiding problem: 
“What philosophy has lacked most of all is precision” (Creative Mind 1) By 
“philosophy” Bergson effectively means “metaphysics,” and by the problem of 
“precision” he means the lack of a method that can reliably deliver precision in 
metaphysics, which is to say precise knowledge about metaphysical reality. In Part I of 
the introduction there will be no direct discussion of “problematisation” and the 
problematic nature/method of philosophy – that will be the subject of Part II, which 
poses as its guiding problem “the stating of problems” in philosophy. But as Bergson 
makes clear at the start of Part II, it is none other than his pursuit of precision in 
philosophy that leads to the development of problematic philosophy. Let us then look 
briefly at what Bergson means by “precision” in philosophy before turning to address 
the characteristics of his problematic philosophy more explicitly. 
 
Bergson begins with a fairly simplistic claim: there is reality on the one hand, and on 
the other there are various explanations of reality. Philosophy, or metaphysics more 
exactly, by and large involves the construction of philosophical concepts and systems 
that aim to explain reality – or more specifically, the fundamental nature of [end of p. 
32] being and the world. But in almost all cases, Bergson thinks, the metaphysics 
advanced is “too wide for reality” (Creative Mind 1), which is to say that it can hold as 
true for a world or universe that is radically different from the one we do occupy. For 
instance, many metaphysical accounts 
 
could apply equally well to a world in which neither plants nor animals have existence, 
only men, and in which men would quite possibly do without eating and drinking, 
where they would neither sleep nor dream nor let their minds wander […], and where 
everything might just as easily go backwards and be upside down. (Ibid.) 
 
If your metaphysics can do something like this then it is questionable how much it really 
tells us about reality, for a metaphysical explanation should correspond to reality but 
not a possible reality or a state of affairs that admits the impossible just as readily as 
the real. “Let us have done,” Bergson implores us, “with great systems embracing all 
the possible, and sometimes even the impossible!” (50) And in their place, “let us 
demand of our theory that it embrace the real so closely that between the two no other 
interpretation can find room” (ibid.). Or as he puts it more fully near the beginning of 
the introduction: 
 
The only explanation we should accept as satisfactory is one which fits tightly to its 
object, with no space between them, no crevice in which any other explanation might 
equally well be lodged; one which fits the object only and to which alone the object 
lends itself. (1) 
 
Bergson is of the opinion that science, or more specifically mathematics, does this 
especially well when applied to objects of a certain kind – static objects. But when it 
comes to time, Bergson argues that its proper conception “eludes mathematical 
treatment” (2). It is in this realm of “real time,” or time as flow, that metaphysics should 
come into its own. According to Bergson, metaphysics dates from Zeno of Elea and his 
various paradoxes to do with movement and change (6, 117). The unfortunate effect of 
these paradoxes, however, is that they have prompted philosophers from Plato onwards 
“to seek the true and coherent reality in what does not change” (117). The nature of 
time, in other words, has been sought by many metaphysicians outside of time. Aside 
from precluding its object from the outset, such an approach, Bergson points out, 
circumvents “what our senses and consciousness perceive,” substituting in its place “a 
more or less artificial arrangement of concepts, a hypothetical construction” (7). And 
as Bergson goes on to say: 
 
One might as well discourse on the subject of the cocoon from which the butterfly is to 
emerge, and claim that the fluttering, changing, living butterfly finds its raison d’être 
and fulfillment in the immutability of its shell. On the contrary, let us unfasten the 
cocoon, awaken the chrysalis; let us restore to movement its mobility, to change its 
fluidity, to time its duration. Who knows but what the “great insoluble problems” will 
remain attached to the outer shell? They were not concerned with either movement or 
change or time, but solely with the conceptual cocoon which we mistakenly took for 
them or for their equivalent. Metaphysics will then become experience itself; and 
duration will be revealed as it really is, – unceasing creation, the uninterrupted up-surge 
of novelty. (Ibid.) 
 
As we can see from this passage, many metaphysical analyses fall foul of Bergson’s 
demand for “precision” because they study the wrong object. It may be that a cocoon 
is easy to analyse, due to its immobility, but such knowledge is of limited value if the 
aim is to understand the nature of butterflies. It follows that if one wishes to understand 
the nature of time, movement or change, the application of a method that freezes time 
and/or operates outside of time in order to extract “a system of abstract general ideas” 
will not suffice (7). A more precise explanation is required, one that remains wedded 
to the object under analysis – in this case time – which in turn calls for an appropriate 
method that itself remains within time. [end of p. 33] 
 
From this short overview we can see how for Bergson the problem of precision in 
philosophy is a problem that centres on the nature of real time, or duration. The problem 
of precision then arises in the disjuncture between metaphysical reality and 
epistemological efforts to gain accurate knowledge of this reality, due to our tendency 
to study the wrong object. The problem at play here is thus both metaphysical and 
methodological – our problem, in other words, is that we lack an appropriate method 
for delivering metaphysical precision. It follows that the problem of precision explored 
in Part I of the introduction to The Creative Mind beckons to another: the method by 
which we examine metaphysical problems. Explicating his methodological approach to 
metaphysics, as a problematic approach, is thus the task of Part II of the introduction 
– a problematic approach that he titles “the stating of problems” (sometimes translated 
alternatively as “stating of the problems”). 
 
 
The Stating of Problems 
 
Part II of the introduction to The Creative Mind commences with the comment that it 
was his conclusions on the subject of duration that prompted Bergson to develop a 
method capable to delivering precise knowledge of it. The controversial name that 
Bergson gives to this method is “intuition.” This name is controversial, and in some 
respects regrettable, because of the conceptual baggage that the term has attracted 
throughout the history of philosophy. Bergson was, of course, well aware that his use 
of the word intuition could lead to some confusion, but he ultimately concludes that it 
 remains the most appropriate word, since it designates “a mode of knowing” distinct 
from intelligence (Creative Mind 18). Bergson, as such, relies upon his readers to take 
note of how his notion of intuition (and intelligence for that matter) differs from 
conventional uses of the term. As Bergson makes clear, intuition for him is not an 
instinct or feeling: “Not one line of what I have written could lend itself to such an 
interpretation” (69). Nor does Bergsonian intuition involve a “search for the eternal” 
(18). Here, Bergson is contrasting his meaning of intuition with other great thinkers 
associated with the term, such as Schelling and Schopenhauer. According to Bergson, 
his treatment of intuition and intelligence is if anything the converse of these other great 
thinkers: whereas the intellect is a mechanism that fixates elements in time (or removes 
them from time) for the purposes of analysing their relations, intuition takes the 
movement of time – duration – as primary: “to think intuitively is to think in duration” 
(22). Intelligence, for Bergson, thus starts with the immobile and then “reconstructs” 
mobility, like a flip-book illustration or a reel of film. Intuition, on the other hand, starts 
from movement and considers immobility to be an abstraction from reality. Put 
differently, intelligence “concerns itself with things,” which is to say the static, whereas 
intuition is concerned essentially with change and growth (ibid.). The great advantage 
of the intellect is that it is well suited to abstract manipulation and the rearrangement of 
existing elements within an ideal realm – an aspect of human existence that is 
fundamental and most certainly useful. Intuition, by contrast, involves an effort that “is 
arduous and cannot last,” which is why the effort must be constantly renewed or begun 
again as time continues to flow (ibid.). 
 
Bergson thus reverses the received positioning of intelligence and intuition. For 
Bergson, it is the intellect that dallies with the eternal, in so far as intellectual analysis 
abstracts away from reality and presumes an atemporal realm in which to do so, 
whereas intuition involves going back into duration and is thus the effort to get back in 
touch with real time and reality. So put, intuition aims at concrete knowledge or 
knowledge of the concrete, as opposed to the abstract; moreover, it seeks to reach this 
knowledge not by way of the abstract, as is customary in many metaphysics, but through 
sustained engagement and connection with the concrete, since this latter route enables 
a tighter fit between object and explanation (i.e., metaphysical precision). 
 
To demonstrate this, Bergson briefly reflects on some of the great concepts in 
philosophy – [end of p. 34] such as Substance, Ego, Idea and Will. Such uber-concepts 
are notable for their tendency and ability to totalise reality. But as Bergson argues, if 
these concepts are capable of “explaining everything deductively,” it is because with 
such concepts all has “been given beforehand, in a principle which is the concept of 
concepts, all the real and all the possible” (Creative Mind 19).4 Unity is thus produced 
by such concepts, but it is an artificial unity that is posited hypothetically from the 
outset before being (unsurprisingly) rediscovered and overlayed onto reality. In contrast 
to this tradition in metaphysics, Bergson advocates a more “intuitive” alternative: 
 
How much more instructive would be a truly intuitive metaphysics, which would 
follow the undulations of the real! True, it would not embrace in a single sweep the 
totality of things; but for each thing it would give an explanation which would fit it 
exactly, and it alone. It would not begin by defining or describing the systematic unity 
of the world: who knows if the world is actually? Experience alone can say, and unity, 
if it exists, will appear at the end of the search as a result; it is impossible to posit it at 
the start as a principle. Furthermore, it will be a rich, full unity, the unity of a continuity, 
the unity of our reality, and not that abstract and empty unity, which has come from 
one supreme generalization, and which could just as well be that of any possible world 
whatsoever. It is true that philosophy then will demand a new effort for each new 
problem. No solution will be geometrically deduced from another. No important truth 
will be achieved by the prolongation of an already acquired truth. We shall have to give 
up crowding universal science potentially into one principle. (19–20; see also 71–72) 
 
In this passage we can begin to see how the relation of intuition with movement and 
time calls for a problem-based method in philosophy that requires “a new effort for 
each new problem.”5  By associating this problematic method with “precision” in 
philosophy, Bergson is also attempting to counteract the recurring accusations that his 
notion/method of intuition is “fuzzy” or lacks “rigour.” Intuition is indeed obscure, 
Bergson is willing to admit, but that description depends on what one means by 
“clarity” and “obscurity.” When an idea is said to be “clear” or “clearly presented,” it 
is often because the idea and/or its presentation draws on elements that are already 
“known.” Ideas of this kind may involve a new arrangement of pre-existing elements, 
but in such instances “Our intelligence, finding only the old in the new, feels itself on 
familiar ground; it is at ease; it ‘understands’” (23). There is, however, an alternative 
kind or sense of clarity when it comes to new ideas – that of the “radically new and 
absolutely simple idea, which catches as it were an intuition” (ibid.). In one respect, 
such ideas are the opposite of clear – they are obscure and incomprehensible, inasmuch 
as they are properly new rather than rearrangements of the old. But while such an idea 
may itself be obscure, its effect is to dissipate obscurities, which is why it is correct to 
align them with clarity. Unlike the first kind of clear ideas, which are clear because they 
rely upon already established understandings, this second kind produces new 
understandings, which in turn shed light on their surrounds. 
 
Intuition, as such, may be obscure, but this is to be expected given that intuition aims 
to produce genuinely new knowledge about new and specific problems. And when it 
does so, “the problems we considered insoluble will resolve themselves, or rather, be 
dissolved, either to disappear definitively, or to present themselves in some other way” 
(ibid.). The effect of this so-called obscurity is thus clarity. By contrast, intellectual 
ideas or ideas of the intellect invariably begin life as “clear,” since they garner their 
intelligibility from the pre-existent and “ready-made,” but for this very reason we might 
also say that they contribute to confusion and obscurity when attempting to comprehend 
new problems and the “problem of the new”: “One must therefore distinguish between 
the ideas which keep their light for themselves, making it penetrate immediately into 
their slightest recesses, and those whose [end of p. 35] radiation is exterior, illuminating 
a whole region of thought” (ibid.).6 
 
Philosophers who analyse and explain reality through the use of “ready-made” ideas 
thus have a natural advantage when it comes to fabricating the initial impression of 
clarity, for their ideas are couched in the pre-existing and shared conventions of thought 
and language. But to the extent that one problem differs from the next and each is 
singular in at least one respect, Bergson contends that a “new effort” is required for 
each that does not merely rely upon “ready-made” abstractions. This shift in focus from 
the rearrangement of the given to the articulation of the new on its own terms, one could 
say, constitutes the essence of Bergson’s problematic methodology: 
 
But the truth is that in philosophy and even elsewhere it is a question of finding the 
problem and consequently of positing it, even more than of solving it. For a speculative 
problem is solved as soon as it is properly stated. By that I mean that its solution exists 
 then, although it may remain hidden and, so to speak, covered up: the only thing left to 
do is to uncover it. But stating the problem is not simply uncovering, it is inventing. 
Discovery, or uncovering, has to do with what already exists actually or virtually; it 
was therefore certain to happen sooner or later. Invention gives being to what did not 
exist; it might never have happened. Already in mathematics and still more in 
metaphysics, the effort of invention consists most often in raising the problem, in 
creating the terms in which it will be stated. The stating and solving of the problem are 
here very close to being equivalent; the truly great problems are set forth only when 
they are solved. (36–37) 
 
Thus we arrive at what Bergson means by the title of Part II of the introduction, “the 
stating of problems.” Bergson strongly advocates a problematic and problem-based 
approach to philosophy, but this does not mean that he is concerned with trying to 
“solve” the remaining inherited problems of philosophy. His ambition is rather to posit 
problems that have been hitherto poorly stated. Moreover, the stating of problems for 
Bergson is not akin to a “stock-take” exercise, such as that performed by Bertrand 
Russell in his The Problems of Philosophy (1912). More controversially, for Bergson 
the stating of a problem is the invention of a problem. To properly state a problem is 
thus to invent it and dissolve it all at once. 
 
 
Fictitious, Phantom and Pseudo-problems 
 
In his book on Bergson, Gilles Deleuze brings this discussion of problems and 
problematic philosophy to the fore of his reading. Indeed, the first chapter of 
Bergsonism is dedicated to developing a highly analytic interpretation of Bergson’s 
problematic philosophy, going so far as to articulate “rules” for Bergson’s problem-
based methodology (something which Bergson never explicitly did himself). It is 
perhaps unsurprising that the first of these “rules” commences by reciting at length the 
climactic passage quoted directly above about “truly great problems.” But as Deleuze 
notes astutely in the “first rule” of Bergson’s problem-based methodology, the “great 
virtue” of Bergson’s problematic approach is that it facilitates “an intrinsic 
determination of the false in the expression ‘false problem’” (Bergsonism 17). While it 
is common to say that there are true or false solutions to a given problem, we know that 
this standard set-up will not hold for Bergson, as his concern is to posit/invent/dissolve 
problems rather than “find” true solutions to ready-made problems. This does not mean, 
however, that Bergson has no regard for truth and falsity. For Bergson, though, it is at 
the level of problems, not solutions, that one must ascertain truth and falsity, for if a 
problem can be shown to be false then it will be not so much solved as dissolved. As 
Deleuze puts it in an earlier essay on Bergson, “there are false problems more than there 
are false solutions, more than there are false solutions for true problems” (Desert 
Islands 22). For this section of the paper I will therefore examine how Bergson tackles 
the issue of false problems, or what he otherwise calls “fictitious,” “phantom” and 
“pseudo-” problems. [end of p. 36] 
 
In his seminal lecture “The Possible and the Real,” Bergson says the following: 
 
I say that there are pseudo-problems, and that they are the agonizing problems of 
metaphysics. I reduce them to two. One gave rise to theories of being, the other to 
theories of knowledge. (Creative Mind 78) 
 
The first thing to note about this quote is that when Bergson speaks of “pseudo-
problems” he is referring specifically to the field of metaphysics – or, perhaps more 
accurately, metaphysics and epistemology. It is therefore important to acknowledge that 
he does not mean to suggest that all problems in the entirety of thought can be classified 
under these two types. Even within the confines of metaphysics and epistemology it is 
doubtful that Bergson would insist upon reducing all problems to these two (which is 
to say that the existence of a third sort of problem would not necessarily negate his 
argument). Bergson’s more restrained aim is rather to “exorcise certain phantom 
problems which obsess the metaphysician, that is to say, each one of us” (46).7 
 
There are three fictitious/phantom/pseudo-problems that Bergson discusses in 
particular. To begin with, he questions the validity of the enduring metaphysical 
question: “why is there being, why is there something rather than nothing?” This 
problem, Bergson accepts, will never be solved, but in saying that, “it should have never 
been raised” (78). As the passage proceeds: “[This problem] arises only if one posits a 
nothingness which supposedly precedes being” (ibid.). In Bergson’s view, the idea of 
“nothing” is paradoxical, for at the very least it “designates the absence of what we are 
seeking, we desire, expect” (ibid.), and such delimitations make nothing “something.” 
The situation is the same when it comes to the problem of order/disorder: “why is the 
universe well-ordered?” For Bergson, this is the “problem of knowledge,” or more 
exactly, a problem that the mind fabricates, for “disorder is simply the order we are not 
looking for” (80). So as with the issue of nothing/something, the term “disorder” is 
predicated on “order,” posited by/in the mind, and the suggestion that order is 
“superadded to an ‘absence of order’ implies an absurdity” (ibid.). 
 
Bergson’s final example of “nonexistent problems” concerns the notions of the possible 
and the real. It is common to presume that a possibility precedes its appearance in 
reality. Bergson contentiously asserts, however, that the reverse is true: “For the 
possible is only the real with the addition of an act of mind which throws its image back 
into the past, once it has been enacted” (81).8 The suggestion that the possibility of a 
thing appears after the thing has been realised might seem to be manifestly mistaken, 
but the argument here again turns on the connection between metaphysics and 
epistemology – which is to say, the way in which some metaphysical problems are the 
product of epistemological practices. When someone says that something was possible 
before it was realised, the term “possible” can refer to two things. If what is meant is 
“that there was no insurmountable obstacle to its realisation,” then Bergson has no 
qualms with this “negative” sense of possibility (83). But when the term is used in a 
more “positive” sense, where a possibility or several possibilities are sketched out in 
thought and as such pre-exist their realisation “under the form of an idea” (ibid.), then 
this leads to the pseudo-problem of “nonexistence” described above. Thus when 
Bergson says that the real precedes the possible he is not arguing for backwards 
causation. Nor does he mean to deny that the future can be gleaned from the present in 
a closed abstract system devoid of duration, such as we find in mathematics. His point 
is rather that the “positive” sense of possibility, as it is commonly employed in 
metaphysics and everyday life, involves a trick of the mind, since its formulation 
presupposes rather than precedes reality: “If you close the gate you know no one will 
cross the road; it does not follow that you can predict who will cross when you open it” 
(ibid.).9 
 
 In each of these examples, Bergson says, the false problem of nonexistence arises out 
of a confusion of the “more” with the “less”: it would appear to be obvious that there is 
less in nothing than something, less in disorder [end of p. 37] than order, and less in 
the possible than the real. But Bergson argues that the converse is the case: 
 
there is more intellectual content in the ideas of disorder and nothingness when they 
represent something than in those of order and existence, because they imply several 
orders, several existences and, in addition, a play of wit which unconsciously juggles 
with them. (81)10 
 
If it is often assumed that there is more in something than nothing etc., it is because we 
have a tendency to start in the wrong place – with nothing, despite the fact that pure 
nothingness can only exist as an idea in the mind and is thus predicated on something, 
a fact of reality confirmed by experience. If one starts with nothing, or with nonbeing, 
then it would be obvious that a “thing” or being is more than nothing or nonbeing. A 
simple glance at these words written down on paper, however, alerts us to Bergson’s 
point: the word “nonbeing” is based on the word “being”; it is “being” with three letters 
tacked on the front, just as “nothing” is “thing” + “no.” There is thus more in nonbeing 
than being, for the former relies on the latter, along with the idea of negation and the 
mind that abstractly posits it. In Deleuze’s words: 
 
In the idea of nonbeing there is in fact the idea of being, plus a logical operation of 
generalized negation, plus the particular psychological motive for that operation (such 
as when a being does not correspond to our expectation and we grasp it purely as the 
lack, the absence of what interests us). (Bergsonism 17) 
 
According to Deleuze’s rulebook, the false problems we have been discussing just now, 
which concern a confusion of the “more” and the “less” when considering matters of 
existence, can be referred to collectively as “nonexistent problems.” These false 
problems, in turn, can be distinguished from those that are the result of “badly stated” 
questions. While this way of framing things is not entirely consistent with Bergson’s 
own explanation (which fails to make the same sharp distinction), it does serve as a 
useful reminder of the importance that the manner of “stating” or “positing” plays in 
the perpetuation, or alternatively dissolution, of false problems. In fact, Bergson 
commences his discussion of pseudo-problems in “The Possible and the Real” by 
stating: 
 
I believe that the great metaphysical problems are in general badly stated, that they 
frequently resolve themselves of their own accord when correctly stated, or else are 
problems formulated in terms of illusion which disappear as soon as the terms of the 
formula are more closely examined. (Creative Mind 77) 
 
From this quote it may seem that Bergson is making a linguistic point, as if 
metaphysical problems were the product of anomalies in language and could be solved 
through linguistic analysis, perhaps with the addendum that “whereof one cannot speak, 
thereof one must be silent” (Wittgenstein 189). But as the passage continues it is made 
clear that for Bergson the issue of “badly stated” problems has primarily to do with the 
metaphysical nature of movement and change. The great “badly stated” problems of 
metaphysics “arise in fact from our habit of transposing into fabrication what is 
creation. Reality is global and undivided growth, progressive invention, duration: it 
resembles a gradually expanding rubber balloon assuming at each moment unexpected 
forms” (Creative Mind 77). But because of the way in which the intellect works, as 
discussed above, human intelligence segments and freezes this expanding whole when 
trying to understand it. When reality is manipulated and refashioned in this manner, 
devoid of duration, it is then no surprise that the intellect is “able to foresee any one 
state of the whole: by positing a definite number of stable elements one has, 
predetermined, all their possible combinations” (ibid.). As Bergson thus concludes, “the 
failure to recognize radical novelty is the original cause of those badly stated 
metaphysical questions” (78). 
 
We can now see how Bergson’s fictitious/phantom/pseudo-problems not only have to 
do with a confusion of the “more” and the “less” [end of p. 38] and the manner in which 
they are “badly stated”; these two facets are also entwined with the category of duration 
– a situation that was perhaps to be expected, given that for Bergson metaphysics as a 
discipline fundamentally has to do with movement and change. Making this point in his 
two-part introduction to The Creative Mind, Bergson notes two formative examples 
from his early work on these connections: “the problem of liberty,” he says, is “a 
pseudo-problem born of a confusion of duration and extension” (15–16). The same 
confusion, Bergson then claims, is also responsible for the mistaken belief that moods 
can be isolated and separated, as if they were “an intensity which is measurable” (16). 
In each case a confusion is taking place between the butterfly and its cocoon. More to 
the point, there is a failure to properly distinguish between the two in the first place. 
And this is why Bergson says that “the habit of proceeding from emptiness to fullness” 
(i.e., “nonexistent problems”) is already implied in “the failure to recognize radical 
novelty” (i.e., “badly stated questions”) (78). Both can be traced to the activity of the 
intellect, and both can be dissolved through a more appropriate appreciation of 
movement and change through the faculty of intuition. 
 
 
Articulating the Two Advantages of Bergsonian 
Problematisation 
 
In his 1960 lecture course on Bergson, Deleuze states that there are “two advantages,” 
or aspects, to the method we have been discussing. The “negative” aspect pertains to 
the way in which the method affords a separation of true and false problems, whereas 
the “positive” aspect concerns the way in which the method “makes it possible for 
problems to be posed in terms of time” (Deleuze, “Lecture Course” 84). In most cases 
it is necessary to undertake the “negative” aspect first, due to the existing status quo in 
metaphysical analyses of commencing with general abstract ideas – a state of affairs 
naturally engendered by the activity of the intellect. As we have seen, Bergson seeks to 
avoid those approaches that begin by positing vague notions such as “something” and 
“nothing.” In contrast to such “dialectical” methods,11 the “Bergsonian question,” as 
Deleuze puts it, is “why this rather than something else” (Desert Islands 24).12 By 
attending to the detail of “this” thing and “that” thing, Bergson’s metaphysics is a kind 
of empiricism, “But an empiricism worthy of the name, an empiricism which works 
only according to measure, sees itself obliged to make an absolutely new effort for each 
new object it studies” (Creative Mind 147).13 The driving rationale for this, however, 
is not merely because various things differ from one another in actuality; rather, it is 
because “being is difference and not the immovable or the undifferentiated” (Desert 
Islands 25). The specific problem with treating being as a generality is thus that it makes 
 of being “something immovable or undifferentiated that, in the immobile ensemble in 
which it is set, can only be distinguished from nothingness, from non-being” (24). In 
other words, the problem with general ideas and problematics is that they are detached 
or abstracted away from time as duration. Hence the imbrication of the negative and 
positive aspects of the method. 
 
The positive aspect of the method, we should be sure to note, does not consist in simply 
making up problems or ideas willy-nilly. On the contrary, it requires close attention to 
the nature of a thing in time; and this in turn demands close attention to the nature and 
experience of duration, as befits an empirical method “worthy of the name.”14 But how, 
one might still be wondering, does this all work in practice? How are we to state and 
solve problems in terms of time rather than space? To gain precise knowledge of the 
real, according to Bergson, we must rediscover true differences in kind and track their 
articulation. When we do this, we engage in a process of division – the dividing of a 
composite into its pure differences in kind, one kind from another. If duration is 
significant in this process, it is not merely because it guides intuition when navigating 
problems; more profoundly, duration is what gives the rule of division itself. Why? 
Because it is [end of p. 39] that which, by definition, differs from itself – indeed, 
according to Deleuze, “Everything Bergson has to say about [duration] comes down to 
this” (37). 
 
Recall that for Bergson the aim of metaphysical inquiry should be to pair as tightly as 
possible an object with a concept, so that for each thing there is only one adequate 
explanation, and vice versa. Another way of putting this would be to say that 
metaphysical analysis should aim to isolate a thing by explaining how it is different 
from everything else. In Deleuzian parlance this means articulating the internal 
difference of a thing: 
 
If philosophy has a positive and direct relation to things, it is only insofar as philosophy 
claims to grasp the thing itself, according to what it is, in its difference from everything 
it is not, in other words, in its internal difference […]. This unity of the thing and the 
concept is internal difference, which one reaches through differences of nature. (32–
33) 
 
Deleuze’s use of the term “internal” here is interesting because one might have 
presumed that when a thing is distinguished from other things then what has been 
established is the nature of its external difference – the difference between two things. 
There is no question that intuition, at the outset, involves the separation of things 
according to their differences in kind, but as Deleuze says, “the difference of nature 
between two things is still not the internal difference of the thing itself” (33). How, 
then, do we move from the difference of nature between two things to the internal 
difference of the thing itself, the latter being that which defines the nature of a thing? 
 
Deleuze responds to this conundrum by examining the principal example in Bergsonian 
philosophy that addresses the issue: the division of duration and space. According to 
Bergson, the notion of abstract time in modern metaphysics is a composite of space and 
duration, each with its respective tendencies that differ in nature (relaxation for space 
and contraction for duration). However, Bergson also defines duration as that which 
differs from itself, for the essence of time is to continually change and become other to 
what it was. In this respect, duration is not merely a difference of nature in contrast to 
other natures; more profoundly, the nature of duration is to differ in nature. The upshot 
of this is that the division at play here is not so much between two differences of nature 
– this nature from that nature – but rather the separation of differences of nature from 
differences in degree. 
 
We can now see how what began as a separation of differences of nature, one nature 
from another, culminates in a separation of that which differs in nature from that which 
does not. Put differently, it is no longer accurate to say that the division is between two 
kinds of difference, this kind and that kind; rather, on one side of the ledger resides 
differences in kind, while on the other is differences in degree. In this division, we have 
moved from an articulation of external differences to a distinction between that which 
differs internally and that which differs externally. Of these two differences, external 
and internal, it is the latter that is primary. Why? Because external difference relies 
upon an identification of two natures to discern their difference, thereby subordinating 
difference to identity, whereas internal difference relies upon nothing other than itself 
– or more exactly, the othering of itself – to produce differences of nature (since its 
nature is to differ in nature). And it is for this reason that duration is so important to the 
intuitive method of problematisation: duration, as internal difference, is what gives the 
rule of differentiation, facilitating as a consequence the further articulation of difference 
into kind/degree and one kind from another. Thinking in time is thus not merely a 
requirement for the separation of differences in kind; it is the means by which we access 
internal difference, opening out in turn onto difference in the world. 
 
Bergson’s well-known description of the dissolving lump of sugar is perhaps the best 
way of illustrating this point. Chapter 1 of Bergson’s Creative Evolution begins with 
the assertion that “The existence of which we are most [end of p. 40] assured and which 
we know best is unquestionably our own” (1). Referring back to his previous books, 
Bergson then claims that when we reflect on this existence the first thing we find is 
change: “I find, first of all, that I pass from state to state” (ibid.). These “states,” 
however, are by no means discrete homogeneities. On the contrary, every state itself 
undergoes continual change: “states thus defined cannot be regarded as distinct 
elements. They continue each other in an endless flow” (3). As this endless flow 
suggests, states do not repeat themselves, for even when a state is said to occur again it 
is distinct from the first instance by virtue of its being the second iteration, and 
furthermore it is informed by the memory of the first. Novelty is thus guaranteed, as is 
unforeseeability: 
 
For to foresee consists of projecting into the future what has been perceived in the past, 
or of imagining for a later time a new grouping, in a new order, of elements already 
perceived. But that which has never been perceived, and which is at the same time 
simple, is necessarily unforeseeable. (6) 
 
The critical question then arises: if this assessment holds for conscious beings, can we 
extend the findings to existence in general? At first it would appear not, for material 
objects seem to present opposite characteristics: “Either [a material object] remains as 
it is, or else, if it changes under the influence of an external force, our idea of this change 
is that of a displacement of parts which themselves do not change” (7–8). Material 
objects would also seem to lend themselves to foreseeability: 
 
A superhuman intellect could calculate, for any moment of time, the position of any 
point of the system in space. And as there is nothing more in the form of the whole than 
 the arrangement of its parts, the future forms of the system are theoretically visible in 
its present configuration. (8) 
 
Bergson’s ultimate conclusion, however, is that such initial impressions are only made 
possible by a disregard for duration – a disregard that results from our 
intellectualisation of matter, which removes/abstracts matter from real time. The key 
passage reads as follows: 
 
Yet succession is an undeniable fact, even in the material world. Though our reasoning 
on isolated systems may imply that their history, past, present, and future, might be 
instantaneously unfurled like a fan, this history, in point of fact, unfolds itself gradually, 
as if it occupied a duration like our own. If I want to mix a glass of sugar and water, I 
must, willy nilly, wait until the sugar melts [sic]. This little fact is big with meaning. 
For here the time I have to wait is not that mathematical time which would apply 
equally well to the entire history of the material world, even if that history were spread 
out instantaneously in space. It coincides with my impatience, that is to say, with a 
certain portion of my own duration, which I cannot protract or contract as I like. It is 
no longer something thought, it is something lived. (7–8) 
 
The purpose of this anecdote is to demonstrate the fundamental importance of time for 
assessing reality. Imagine a scenario in which we assess the nature of a sugar lump 
using purely spatial means. In such an exercise, as Deleuze points out, “all we will ever 
grasp are differences in degree between that sugar and any other thing” (Bergsonism 
31). The dimension of time is therefore needed in order to properly see how the sugar 
lump differs in kind from other things. Duration, moreover, does not only reveal a 
difference in kind between the sugar lump and other things; as the spectacle of 
dissolving the sugar lump in water capably shows, over time and in time the sugar lump 
itself undergoes change – it differs from itself. Also take note of the means by which 
the dimension of time reveals itself in this example: by my having to wait, my 
impatience. From this “little fact” it becomes apparent that it is through the fact of my 
own duration, of which I have a privileged and reliable knowledge, that the duration of 
the sugar lump is made evident, allowing me in turn to assess how it differs in kind. In 
Deleuze’s words, “my own [end of p. 41] duration, such as I live it in the impatience 
of waiting, for example, serves to reveal other durations that beat to other rhythms, that 
differ in kind from mine” (32). This is why duration “gives the rule” of division, and 
why thinking in terms of duration provides the “fundamental meaning” of Bergson’s 
problematic method/metaphysics (31). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The major stages/concepts of Bergson’s work are well known: duration, memory, the 
élan vital. The key problems that animate Bergson’s work can similarly be identified 
without too much trouble: causality and free will, the relation of memory to matter, and 
the problems of change and creativity. Discussion of Bergson’s method of 
problematisation as a central plank of his work, however, is somewhat less 
commonplace. It is also far more fraught, since a not insignificant amount of this 
problematising method remains implicit in Bergson’s work. As we have seen, far from 
preceding his metaphysical inquiries, Bergson’s philosophical method gradually 
emerges from his conclusions on the subject of duration. This may seem strange to 
some, but as his remarks on “precision in philosophy” demonstrate, it could be no other 
way for Bergson. The manner in which one thinks cannot be detached from the 
explanations that thought forms for reality. But while such a straightforward comment 
could be endorsed from a range of philosophical positions, Bergson’s significant 
contribution is to insist that the method of thought does not precede the metaphysical 
reality under consideration, and nor can it be artificially abstracted and detached from 
metaphysical reality without adverse consequences for the precision and usefulness of 
the findings. Bergson’s “problematic” thinking is thus at once methodological and 
metaphysical, and in the most intimate of ways. It is then little wonder that Deleuze, 
arguably the most important and influential successor of Bergson, asserts that this 
metaphysical-method or methodological-metaphysics is in fact responsible for 
determining the progress of Bergson’s work as a whole (Bergsonism 14) – a bold 
statement, but one that is supported by Bergson’s own retrospective view of his work, 
as this paper has attempted to detail.15 
 
 
Notes 
1 Patrice Maniglier claims that Gaston Bachelard, and to be more specific his text Le 
Rationalisme appliqué (1949), is the origin for twentieth-century and contemporary 
interest in France for problematisation (21). While there is no denying that Bachelard 
plays an important part in the history of the problematic in French thought, I am of the 
view that this reading of the situation overlooks the contribution of Bergson. At the 
very least, I cannot follow Maniglier in his tracing of Deleuze’s problematic philosophy 
back to Bachelard (21–22), since Bergson is quite clearly the more accurate source. As 
an examination of Deleuze’s early work on Bergson reveals, it is through his 
engagement with Bergson that Deleuze first starts to develop his own problematic 
philosophy. One might also note that in a letter written by Deleuze to Althusser in 
February 1966 – the same year Bergsonism would be published – Deleuze remarked 
that he was in the process of reading Althusser’s books and wanted to say that he too 
had been working on “the concept of the ‘problem’” (see Dosse 227). As this suggests, 
the influence of the “French epistemological tradition” on Deleuze’s “problematic” 
thinking is ancillary at best.	
 
2 This paper by During provides an excellent response to Osborne’s “What is a 
Problem?,” which seeks to separate the “problematology” of Canguilhem and Foucault 
from Bergson and Deleuze. For instance, while Osborne’s account draws on and 
reinforces Foucault’s infamous delineation of two traditions of French thought – one of 
experience, meaning and the subject, and another of knowledge, rationality and the 
concept – placing Bergson on the former line and [end of p. 42] Canguilhem on the 
latter, During attempts to “problematize” this distinction in order to effect a détente of 
sorts. This debate about traditions of problematisation in French philosophy is 
tangential to the aims of the present paper, though for my part I would hazard to say in 
passing that Osborne’s description of Bergson as the author of a “normative” and 
“legislative” problematic philosophy – a description upon which his Bergson vs. 
Canguilhem distinction depends – is in need of further justification to be convincingly 
maintained.	
 
3 The reader should note that Bergson’s discussion of problematics and false problems 
is progressively developed through the course of his career (see Matter and Memory 
	
 	
xvii, 241; Creative Evolution 178, 220–36, 274–77, 296–99; Creative Mind 147). The 
focus of this paper will be, however, on Bergson’s final position on the matter.	
 
4 See also Bergson, Creative Mind 35: “[A] word can have a definite meaning when it 
designates a thing; it loses that meaning as soon as you apply it to all things.”	
 
5 See also Bergson, Creative Mind 71–72; idem, Matter and Memory 241: “This 
method [of intuition] presents, in its application, difficulties which are considerable and 
ever recurrent, because it demands for the solution of each new problem an entirely 
new effort.”	
 
6 As an aside, and in further response to his critics, Bergson argues that this confusion 
over clarity/obscurity explains why intuition might initially appear as philosophically 
inferior to intelligence. Describing a scene that will be familiar to most students of 
philosophy, Bergson says:	
 
Listen to the discussion between any two philosophers one of whom upholds 
determinism, and the other liberty: it is always the determinist who seems to be in the 
right. He may be a beginner and his adversary a seasoned philosopher. He can plead 
his cause nonchalantly, while the other sweats blood for his. It will always be said of 
him that he is simple, clear and right. He is easily and naturally so, having only to 
collect thought ready to hand and phrases ready-made: science, language, common 
sense, the whole of intelligence is at his disposal. Criticism of an intuitive philosophy 
is so easy and so certain to be well received that it will always tempt the beginner. 
Regret may come later […]. (Creative Mind 24)	
 
7 See also the closing of Bergson’s introduction to Matter and Memory, where he states 
that the second of the book’s two guiding principles is “that the habits formed in action 
find their way up to the sphere of speculation, where they create fictitious problems, 
and that metaphysics must begin by dispersing this artificial obscurity” (xvii).	
 
8 “Backwards over the course of time a constant remodelling of the past by the present, 
of the cause by the effect, is being carried out” (Creative Mind 84–85).	
 
9 For a more detailed examination of Bergson’s “the possible and the real,” see Gunter.	
 
10 When applied to the example of the possible and the real, Bergson says:	
 
The idea immanent in most philosophies and natural to the human mind, of possibles 
which would be realised by an acquisition of existence, is therefore pure illusion. One 
might as well claim that the man in flesh and blood comes from the materialization of 
his image seen in the mirror, because in that real man is everything found in this virtual 
image with, in addition, the solidity which makes it possible to touch it. But the truth 
is that more is needed here to obtain the virtual than is necessary for the real, more for 
the image of the man than for the man himself, for the image of the man will not be 
portrayed if the man is not first produced, and in addition one has to have the mirror. 
(Creative Mind 83)	
 
11 For more on Bergson’s critique of dialectics, see Creative Mind 63.	
 
12 See also Deleuze, Desert Islands 36:	
 
	
It will come as no surprise, then, that a kind of principle of sufficient reason, as well as 
indiscernibles, can be found in Bergson’s work. What he rejects is a distribution that 
locates cause or reason in the genus and the category and abandons the individual to 
contingency, stranding him in space. Reason must reach all the way to the individual, 
the genuine concept all the way to the thing, [end of p. 43] and comprehension all the 
way to “this”. Bergson always asks of difference: why “this” rather than “that”?	
 
13 As the quote continues: “It cuts for the object a concept appropriate to the object 
alone, a concept one can barely say is still a concept, since it applies only to that one 
thing” (Creative Mind 147).	
 
14 In his work on Bergson, Deleuze will refer to this empiricism as a “superior 
empiricism” (see Bergsonism 30; see also Desert Islands 36). Subsequently he will lean 
heavily on this for his own notion of “transcendental empiricism,” which at times will 
be described as “superior” (see Difference and Repetition 57, 143).	
 
15 See also Deleuze, Desert Islands 22. 
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